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Historically, both labor and management in the United States have
strongly opposed labor-union representation on corporate boards of direc-
tors. More recently, a number of American corporations have considered
instituting board representation as a means of gaining union support for
wage and benefit concessions.' Doubts exist, however, as to whether cur-
rent antitrust law proscribes such action. In particular, the prohibition
against interlocking directorates found in section 8 of the Clayton Act2
may prevent different members of the same union from sitting on the
boards of directors of competing firms.
This Note argues that the Clayton Act demands neither a blanket ex-
emption for labor unions from section 8 coverage nor a blanket prohibi-
tion against union members serving as board representatives. On the one
hand, labor unions have the same economic incentives as do other corpo-
rate directors to engage in the anticompetitive behavior that the drafters of
section 8 sought to prevent. On the other hand, a complete bar against
1. In 1973, the Providence and Worcester Railroad became the first American corporation to use
a union representative on its board of directors. Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 1973, at 8, col. 2. In May 1980,
Chrysler Corp. put Douglas A. Fraser, President of the United Automobile Workers (UAW), on its
board of directors. Wall St. J., May 14, 1980, at 6, col. 1. American Motors Corp. (AMC) agreed in
September 1980 to place a union representative on its board of directors pending satisfactory resolu-
tion of the antitrust questions involved in the issue. The plan was later dropped. Interlocking Direc-
torates-Union Representation, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 50,425 (Feb. 26, 1981). In May 1982,
Pan American World Airways elected a union member to serve on its board of directors. Wall St. J.,
May 13, 1982, at 22, col. 5; id., Mar. 5, 1982, at 4, col. 1. The Chrysler, AMC, and Pan American
board representation plans were all made in conjunction with wage and benefit concessions.
Several other unions have unsuccessfully attempted to gain board representation. In 1972, the pilots
of United Air Lines sought board representation at the annual shareholder meeting, but obtained only
5% of the vote. Wall St. J., Apr. 28, 1972, at 34, col. 1; id., Dec. 13, 1971, at 25, col. 5. In 1973, the
United Rubber Workers unsuccessfully proposed that General Tire & Rubber Co. appoint a union
member to its board of directors. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1973, at 5, col. 2. In 1976, the Teamsters
reportedly demanded that two union representatives be appointed to the board of Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. Lassus, What the Teamsters Really Wanted, BEVERAGE WORLD, June 1976, at 34. Also in 1976,
the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers submitted a proposal during the
annual meeting of the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. that a union representative be ap-
pointed to the board of directors. The proposal received 3.3% of the votes cast. R. KUHNE, CO-DETER.
MINATION IN BUSINESS: WORKERS' REPRESENTATIVES IN THE BOARDROOM 103-04 (1980).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976). In relevant part, this section provides:
No person at the same time shall be a director in any two or more corporations, any one of
which has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than $1,000,000, engaged
in whole or in part in commerce . . . if such corporations are or shall have been theretofore,
by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of
competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the provisions of
any of the antitrust laws.
The potential conflict between § 8 and labor-union board representation arises when the board
representative is a member of a union that represents the employees of competing companies and that
has a representative on the board of another firm in the same industry.
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employee representation in unionized industries would prohibit many de-
sirable board representation arrangements that pose no anticompetitive
dangers. A means of preserving the benefits of employee representation in
unionized industries while avoiding the possibility of anticompetitive be-
havior would be to apply section 8 limitations only to those board mem-
bers who "represent" a national union.3 The Note proposes a twofold test
for identifying this class of board members.
I. Labor-Union Board Representation in the United States
Labor-union board representation is widespread in Western Europe,
but both labor and management in the United States have generally op-
posed such representation. In recent years, however, certain American
corporations and labor unions have shown greater interest in board repre-
sentation. This increased interest, arising out of economic difficulties, is
based on a belief that board representation would mitigate certain short-
comings of the collective bargaining process and would increase worker
productivity.
A. American Labor Unions and Board Representation
American labor unions, unlike their European counterparts,4 have tra-
3. See infra pp. 124-25.
4. See, e.g., Meissel & Fogel, Co-determination in Germany: Labor's Participation in Manage-
ment, 9 INT'L LAW. 182 (1975); Simitis, Workers' Participation in the Enterprise-Transcending
Company Law, 38 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1975); Steuer, Employee Representation on the Board: Indus-
trial Democracy or Interlocking Directorate?, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 255, 256-70 (1977);
Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspective from the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23,
64-75 (1966); Note, Employee Codetermination: Origins in Germany, Present Practice in Europe,
and Applicability to the United States, 14 HARV. J. LEGIS. 947 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Employee Codetermination]; Note, The West German Model of Codetermination Under Section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 51 IND. L.J. 795 (1976). The most dramatic example of European employee
board representation, or codetermination, is found in West Germany. A 1951 statute provided that
employee representatives comprise 50% of the supervisory boards of directors in the German steel and
coal industries. 1951 BUNDEGSESETZBLATT, TEIL 1 [BGBI] 347, cited in THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF
LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, CO-DETERMINATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 76-83
(1980) [hereinafter cited as CO-DETERMINATION IN GERMANY]. A second statute, enacted in 1952,
required all public corporations to allocate one-third of the seats on their supervisory boards to em-
ployee representatives. 1952 BGBI 681, cited in CO-DETERMINATION IN GERMANY, supra, at 96-98.
This share was increased to 50% in 1976. 1976 BGBI 1153, cited in CO-DETERMINATION IN GER-
MANY, supra, at 46-72.
During the past decade, several other Western European nations have passed similar legislation
requiring employee representation on corporate boards. A 1976 Swedish statute provided that workers
in firms with more than 25 employees may elect two members to the board of directors; a 1973
Danish law provided workers in firms with more than 50 employees the right to elect two board
members. Norway, Austria, and Luxembourg require that any corporation with more than a certain
number of employees have one-third of the board composed of employees in the company; full-time
union oficials are ineligible to serve. Switzerland, France, and Belgium do not require employee
board representation by statute, although a few companies in those countries have instituted such
programs on their own. See Note, Employee Codetermination, supra, at 970-980.
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ditionally rejected board representation as a proper role for the union.5
Whereas West German unions, for example, have demanded a full voice
in the decisions of management through works councils' and board repre-
sentation,' American unions, perceiving that participation in management
might threaten their independence, have sought to maintain an adversarial
position with respect to management by dealing with the firm exclusively
through the confrontational collective bargaining process.' This reluctance
to pursue board representation has been based on a perception that partic-
ipation in management would decrease the union's independence and ef-
fectiveness. As an official of the American Federation of Labor-Congress
of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) has stated, American unions al-
ready "bargain on more issues than the number [they] might have any
impact on as members of a board of directors."'
In the past few years, however, American unions have begun to demand
more participation in corporate decisionmaking at all levels of the enter-
prise. Within the plant, there has been a dramatic increase in joint labor-
management committees designed to improve productivity, quality of
working life, and community relations.10 Furthermore, a few unions, such
as the United Automobile Workers (UAW) and the Teamsters, have suc-
5. The longstanding view of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions (AFL-CIO) with respect to union board representation was summed up in some widely quoted
remarks by Thomas R. Donohue, executive assistant to former union president George Meany, in
1976: "We do not want to blur in any way the distinction between the respective roles of management
and labor in the plant." Wall St. J., July 17, 1976, at 1, col. 5. Meany himself argued that union
board representation "will not work here. The Germans did it because they were worried about
someone like Hitler reappearing. I never saw a union that was worth a damn unless it was
free-completely and absolutely free." Workers on the Board?, FORBES, June 1, 1976, at 66.
6. Under the Works Constitution Act of 1972, West German employees have extensive participa-
tion rights within the enterprise through employee works councils. The Act requires the employer to
obtain the consent of the works council in matters concerning the structure, organization, and design
of jobs; if the works council refuses its consent on any matter governed by the Act, the issue is arbi-
trated by a labor court. Furthermore, the works council has the right to be informed on a large range
of issues, including financial matters. CO-DETERMINATION IN GERMANY, supra note 4, at 99-101.
7. See supra note 4.
8. For a number of historical reasons, American unions have been much less receptive to partici-
pation than their European counterparts. First, American workers have traditionally been less class-
conscious than European workers. Second, employee representation in the United States has tradition-
ally been a tool of antiunionism. After World War I, employers presented representation plans as a
substitute for unions and collective bargaining. As a result, the American union developed a deep-
seated hostility to any non-union type of worker representation in the enterprise. The National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) was in large part a response to company unions and established collective
bargaining independent of employer influence. Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West
Germany: A Comparative Study from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 375-76
(1980).
9. Wall St. J., July 17, 1976, at 1, col. 5 (quoting Thomas R. Donohue, Executive Assistant to
former AFL-CIO President George Meany).
10. See B. ROBERTS, H. OKAMOTO & G. LODGE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND EMPLOYEE PAR-
TICIPATION IN WESTERN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND JAPAN 67, 70 (1979) (describing workplace
participation in American industry).
Unions in the Boardroom
cessfully demanded board representation."1
Although the labor laws do not require employee participation in cor-
porate decisionmaking"2 and American management historically has
strongly opposed such participation," recent economic downturns have
softened management's position on this issue. For example, certain com-
panies that faced losses have agreed to labor-union board representation in
return for wage and benefit concessions from the union."' Furthermore,
some analysts have predicted that sluggish economic growth and trade def-
icits will encourage future labor-management cooperation in the United
States that might lead to further union participation in corporate decision-
making, including board representation.1 5
B. Rationales for Labor-Union Board Representation
Companies expect labor-union board representation to aid profitability
in two ways. First, board representation might mitigate certain negative
effects of the bargaining system. Under collective bargaining, labor and
management are natural adversaries, each attempting to secure the best
possible contract."' Although both sides have a statutory duty to bargain
in good faith over issues such as wages and benefits, 17 neither side is cor-
11. See supra note 1.
12. The National Labor Relations Act requires employers to bargain with the union concerning
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). This duty
to bargain, however, does not encompass "managerial decisions which lie at the core of en-
trepreneurial control." Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964); see,
e.g., First Nat. Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (no duty to bargain over the
decision to terminate part of operations); Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S.
263, 268 (1965) ("Employer has the absolute right to terminate his entire business for any reason.").
See generally Summers, supra note 8, at 381 (1980) (employee board representation is not a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining).
13. Management has generally opposed labor-union board representation as being contrary to
traditional forms of labor-management relations. See B. ROBERTS, H. OKAMOTO & G. LODGE, supra
note 10, at 70. John Zalusky, an economist in the Research Department of the AFL-CIO, commented
in 1976: "a fundamental problem with the concept of co-determination in the United States is that it
seems likely that management is unwilling to surrender any part of its decision making rights, unless
the firm is in trouble." R. KUHNE, supra note 1, at 103. The Business Roundtable rejected employee
board representation as "inconsistent with U.S. traditions and [the] style of management-labor rela-
tionships at arms length." Statement of Business Roundtable, 33 BUS. LAW. 2083, 2107 (1978).
14. See supra note 1. The Chrysler, American Motors, and Pan American union board represen-
tation plans were all devised in conjunction with wage and benefit concessions.
15. See B. ROBERTS, H. OKAMOTO & G. LODGE, supra note 10, at 69 ("[a] growing number of
analysts of trends in the United States believe that changes in the economic and social climate" will
lead to increased employee participation). But see Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A
Projection of Problems and Potentials, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155, 157 (1982) ("Em-
ployee representation on corporate boards in any meaningful form can be achieved only by
legislation.").
16. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976), is written with the presup-
position that labor and management are natural antagonists and thus stipulates the rules that each
side must follow with respect to the other; in particular, it mandates that all dealings be in good faith.
See generally Summers, supra note 15, at 163.
17. Section 8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (1976), requires the employer to bargain with
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pelled to accept the other's position."' Furthermore, neither side is fully
aware of the other's strengths and weaknesses and hence is skeptical of the
other's proposals. This lack of information can prove inefficient particu-
larly when management is unable to grant certain of the basic demands of
the union, and the union decides to strike. In such a case, even though it
may be in the union's best interest to accept a less-than-ideal contract in
order to maintain members' jobs, the confrontational bargaining system
makes such concessions difficult to achieve.19
Board representation can supplement the collective bargaining system
in this situation by fostering a recognition of the mutuality of interests
between the union and management. By giving the union more informa-
tion about the financial health of the company and its long-term prospects,
the likelihood of stalemate is reduced and that of good faith bargaining
increased. Board representation thus gives management credibility that it
would otherwise not have.20
The second rationale behind labor-union board representation is that it
facilitates the participation of employees in the control of their work envi-
ronment, thereby increasing their productivity. Commentators have ar-
gued that the current malaise in American industry, characterized by high
absenteeism, labor turnover, and low productivity growth, is due in part
to the failure of the enterprise to allow employees more control over the
direction of the firm.2" In Western Europe, and to a lesser extent in the
United States, companies that have given workers greater decisionmaking
control over their immediate work environment have achieved favorable
a union in good faith: "to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."
18. Summers, supra note 8, at 380.
19. Collective bargaining leads to inefficient results when labor and management are unable to
reach an agreement and the union responds with a strike. While such failure to reach an accord is
sometimes due to the intransigence of management, it may also be due to the union's ignorance of the
true financial position of the enterprise. Even though the bargaining table is a poor place for such
information to be conveyed, under the present labor-management relations system in the United States
there is no alternative. See Summers, supra note 15, at 164-66.
20. Union representatives on the board of directors would have access to information concerning
the financial prospects of the firm that they would presumably convey to the union's bargaining repre-
sentatives, if only in general terms. Such information would significantly alter the bargaining process
by forcing the union to deal with the firm's actual financial condition. Such information would be
particularly important in the case of the less successful firm. See generally Summers, supra note 15, at
165-66 (board representation would "strengthen and improve" collective bargaining).
21. See, e.g., P. BLUMBERG, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: THE SOCIOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION 123
(1969) (17 studies show positive effect of worker participation on worker morale and productivity); C.
KING & M. VAN DE VALL, MODELS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 186-87 (1978) (worker participa-
tion in control of enterprise helps dispel alienation that contributes to productivity); B. ROBERTS, H.
OKAMOTO & G. LODGE, supra note 10, at 55-56 (studies suggest worker alienation due to lack of
control over enterprise); Kahn & Katz, Leadership Practices in Relation to Productivity and Morals,
in GROUP DYNAMICS 617-27 (D. Cartwright & A. Zander eds. 1953) (worker motivation related to
control over work environment).
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results.22 Although the productivity benefits of board representation as a
form of employee control over long-term corporate decisionmaking are
more tenuous, the Western European experience suggests that board rep-
resentation is an effective complement to other forms of employee partici-
pation in the enterprise.2
II. Labor-Union Board Representation and the Antitrust Laws
Labor-union board representation can be challenged on a number of
statutory grounds: federal labor law,24 state corporation law,2" or federal
22. The use of employee board representation has improved the profitability of West German
firms. In 1970, a government commission conducted a thorough study of the impact of employee board
representation in West Germany. The Commission concluded that cooperation between labor and
management induced by worker participation had significantly increased profitability by minimizing
industrial strife. See Note, Employee Codetermination, supra note 4, at 960.
23. See, e.g., Strauss & Rosenstein, Workers Participation: A Critical View, 9 INDUS. REL. 197,
200, 212 (1970) (studies in Germany suggest that board representation increases employees' sense of
identification with company); Note, Employee Codetermination, supra note 4, at 992-93
(Scandanavian shopfloor innovations have limited effectiveness unless accompanied by board
representation).
There are other rationales that also support the promotion of employee board representation. First,
even though employee pension funds currently own at least 35% of the equity capital in the United
States, Drucker, Pension Fund "Socialism," 42 PUB. INTEREST 3 (1976), the fiduciaries holding these
shares are prohibited by the Pension Reform Act, 29 U.S.C. § I106(b)(2) (1976), from participating
in management. Hence, employees are denied the opportunity to reap one of the benefits of capital
ownership: the ability to control the ways in which that capital is used. Employee board representa-
tion would be a partial solution to this denial of participation in the fruits of ownership. Second,
employee board representation arguably would bring a new perspective to boardroom deliberations, as
the employee representative would be more likely to challenge management's proposals. Such chal-
lenges would possibly increase the board's control over the affairs of the firm. See Summers, supra
note 15, at 185.
24. Labor-union board representation could be challenged under the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976), or the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29
U.S.C §§ 401-531 (1976). Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that it shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or adminis-
tration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it. . . " 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(2) (1976). When a union member serves as a board director, he becomes a member of manage-
ment. It is therefore arguable that his continued membership in the union constitutes employer domi-
nation or interference under § 8(a)(2). See, e.g., Local 636, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. NLRB,
287 F.2d 354, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (union official's continued participation in union after promotion
to supervisor violates § 8(a)(2)); Note, Serving Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate
Board of Directors, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 639, 640-41 (1981) (union official as board director may
constitute employer interference under § 8(a)(2)).
Section 501(a) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act provides:
The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor organization occupy
positions of trust in relation to such organization and its members as a group. It is, therefore,
the duty of each such person. . . to refrain from dealing with such organization as an adverse
party or in behalf of an adverse party in any matter connected with his duties. ...
29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976). A union member, in his capacity as a board director, may wish to take
actions that seem adverse to his union's interest. Section 501(a) appears to place important limitations
on his ability to take such actions as a board member. See Note, supra, at 645-48 (analyzing union
official's fiduciary obligations under § 501(a)). For example, UAW President Douglas Fraser, while
sitting on the board of directors of Chrysler Corp., called for the union to make additional wage
concessions to stave off impending bankruptcy. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
25. It is a fundamental principle of state corporation law that a director has a fiduciary duty to
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antitrust law.2" Recent judicial interpretations of labor2" and corporation 28
promote the corporation's interests. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939) (board director
cannot "violate the ancient precept against serving two masters" by acting "to the detriment of the
stockholders"). Indeed, a number of state statutes expressly provide that the director owes a fiduciary
duty to the corporation: "Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to the
corporation and to its shareholders and shall discharge the duties of their respective positions in good
faith, and with that diligence and care which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar
circumstances in like positions." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982).
A labor-union official has a duty to represent the interests of the union. See 29 U.S.C. § 501(a)
(1976) (describing fiduciary responsibilities of labor-union officials). When the interests of the union
conflict with the interests of the corporation, a labor-union board representative might be forced to
violate his fiduciary duty to the corporation as well as to the union.
26. The major problem under the antitrust laws, and the problem that this Note addresses, arises
under the Clayton Act's prohibition against interlocking directorates. See supra note 2 (quoting § 8 of
the Clayton Act).
At least one commentator, however, has argued that the mere presence of an employee representa-
tive on a board of directors in a unionized industry might provide circumstantial evidence of agree-
ment or conspiracy to limit competition and thereby violate § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976), which forbids combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade. See Comment, Broadening
the Board: Labor Participation in Corporate Governance, 34 SW. L.J. 963, 971 (1980). Although
circumstantial evidence may create an inference of conspiracy sufficient to prove a violation of the
Sherman Act, it is unlikely that the mere presence of a labor-union official on the board of directors
would be sufficient to prove a violation of § I without some evidence of actual agreement to restrain
trade. Thus, under § 1, union board representation would be prohibited only if evidence of actual
agreement could be produced.
27. With respect to § 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, courts generally have not
found a violation unless management actually controlled the union. See, e.g., Hertzka & Knowles v.
NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1974) (management representatives on employee committees
formed to deal with employer do not violate § 8(a)(2)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975); Federal-
Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 1968) ("It is not the potential for control that
the Act declares unlawful but the actual domination of a labor organization."); Modern Plastics Corp.
v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1967) (NLRB "must prove that the employer's assistance is
actually creating Company control over the Union before it has established a violation"); Coppus
Eng'g Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564, 573 (1st Cir. 1957) (Q 8(a)(2) not violated where plaintiff
demonstrates "no more than cooperation by [the employer] and a possibility of company control");
Anchorage Community Hosp., 225 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1 16,966, at 28,112 (1976) (§ 8(a)(2) not
violated despite union's control of 7 of 15 seats on board of trustees); Note, supra note 24, at 643-45
(union board representation not per se unlawful under § 8(a)(2)).
The language of § 501(a) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act requires that
"the special problems and functions of a labor organization" be considered in evaluating the actions of
union officials. 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976). This clause was specifically designed to ensure that union
officials had broad discretion in conducting union affairs. Therefore, courts have intervened to con-
demn a union official's conduct under § 501 only when the official has manipulated democratic proce-
dures within a union or when he has profited personally at the union's expense. See, e.g., Hood v.
Journeymen Barbers Int'l Union, 454 F.2d 1347, 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) (union officials' breach of
fiduciary duties in managing union pension funds violates § 501(a)); Blanchard v. Johnson, 388 F.
Supp. 208, 214-15 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (union official's failure to inform rank and file adequately about
implications of affiliation agreement undermines union democracy and violates § 501(a)), rev'd in
part, 532 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976). Furthermore, as long as
union officials do not violate the union's constitution, by-laws, and membership resolutions, they do
not violate their fiduciary duties under § 501. See, e.g., Gabauer v. Woodcock, 594 F.2d 662, 668 (8th
Cir.) (en banc) (finding no fiduciary violation when actions "authorized by the union's constitution
and resolutions of the union's national convention"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841 (1979); McNamara v.
Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1164-65 (7th Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976). Thus, if
the union explicitly authorized board representation, a § 501(a) violation could not occur. But see
Summers, Worker Participation in Corporate Management-The United States Version, 1 J. COMP.
CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 157, 177 (1978) (union board representative would deal with union as "ad-
verse party" and arguably violate § 501(a)).
28. Although directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation, they are given broad discretion in
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statutes suggest that they do not threaten union board representation. The
antitrust laws, however, pose a more serious challenge to board represen-
tation. Unresolved at present is the issue of whether board representation
in unionized industries violates the prohibition in section 8 of the Clayton
Act against interlocking directorates between competing corporations. This
ambiguity can have important consequences: fear of liability has prevented
the spread of union board representation in the automobile industry2" and
may discourage its use in other industries.30
A. Prohibition Against Interlocking Directorates
The antitrust laws prohibit interlocking directorates between competi-
tors because of the potential of these interlocks to facilitate anticompetitive
behavior. The language and purpose of section 8 suggest that courts
should apply the ban against interlocking directorates to labor-union
board representation.
1. Antitrust Theory Behind Interlocking Directorates
A primary goal of antitrust law is to insure that society's productive
making decisions on the corporation's behalf. Courts have permitted boards of directors to adopt poli-
cies promoting employee interests even though such policies may run counter to the short-run interests
of the corporation. See, e.g., Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094 (10th Cir. 1972) (creation of
employee stock trust to benefit employees within the discretion of management); Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. v. Steele's Mills, 225 N.C. 302, 308-09, 34 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1945) (trust to help needy
employees valid); Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 17 Misc. 43, 40 N.Y.S. 718 (Sup. Ct. 1896) (exten-
sive employee benefits valid). Thus, because of the dependence of corporate profitability on employee
good will, management has broad discretion to consider employees' needs in developing company pol-
icy. More specifically, because board representation improves employee good will, it is within the
discretion of shareholders to choose an employee representative to serve on the board.
Moreover, even though a union member sitting on a corporate board may have conflicting interests
when he participates in transactions between the union and the corporation, he can avoid this conflict
by disclosing his union relationship and not voting on issues related to the collective bargaining agree-
ment. Courts have generally upheld transactions between the corporation and another party to which
one of the directors owes a fiduciary duty if the director makes full disclosure of his fiduciary interest
to the board of directors and if the transaction is deemed "fair" to the corporation. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 64 Wash. 2d 375, 385-86, 391 P.2d 979, 984 (1964)
(transaction in which director has interest cannot be voided if fair to corporation); Voss Oil Co. v.
Voss, 367 P.2d 977, 979-80 (Wyo. 1962) (same); H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 238, at 465 (2d ed. 1970) (modern cases apply fairness
test). Whether the interested director can count toward a quorum and vote on the issue in question
depends on the relevant state statute. Id. § 238, at 467-68.
29. For example, American Motors Corp. abandoned its plan to place an employee representative
on its board of directors because of uncertainty about the applicability of § 8 of the Clayton Act. For
the same reason, the UAW has decided not to demand employee representation on the boards of other
corporations that compete with Chrysler. Interview with Irving Bluestone, University Professor of
Labor Studies, Wayne State University, in New Haven, Conn. (Nov. 7, 1981) (notes on file with Yale
Law Journal).
30. Since the Justice Department issued an advisory opinion on February 26, 1981, concluding
that § 8 should apply to labor unions, see infra p. 117, only one American corporation, Pan American
World Airways, placed a union representative on its board of directors. Wall St. J., May 13, 1982, at
22, col. 5.
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resources are allocated throughout the economy in a manner that will per-
mit consumers to satisfy their wants as fully as technological constraints
permit."1 One of the chief functions of the antitrust laws, therefore, is to
prevent competitors from engaging in behavior that would distort this effi-
cient allocation of productive resources.
Consistent with this function, antitrust law prohibits various horizontal
market agreements that restrict competition: 32 explicit agreements between
competitors to fix prices,33 divide markets, 4 or dampen price competition
without directly fixing prices; 5 concerted refusals to deal with a firm;3 6
and the dissemination of data about production and pricing if deemed an-
ticompetitive Each of the prohibited horizontal agreements depends
31. Judge Bork has described this goal as "the maximization of consumer welfare." R. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 51 (1978). Maximization of consumer welfare means maximization of
total societal welfare; it does not concern itself with how that welfare is allocated among members of
society.
The legislative history of the antitrust statutes and the case law interpreting those statutes reveal a
second purpose of the antitrust laws. This purpose may be characterized as a "populist" goal of
dispersing wealth, limiting business size, and broadening entrepreneurial opportunities. Although the
two goals of efficient allocation of productive resources and populism frequently conflict in such a
manner that courts must choose between them, populist values often promote economic efficiency. See
I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 103, at 7-8 (1978).
32. Antitrust law also prohibits various vertical agreements between suppliers and retailers that
restrict competition, such as resale price maintenance and territorial restrictions on distribution. For a
discussion of the law prohibiting vertical restraints, see L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST §§ 131-175, at 374-500 (1977). The potential anticompetitive effect of labor-union inter-
locking directorates is limited, however, to horizontal agreements to restrict competition, and hence
this Note considers only those anticompetitive restraints.
33. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 401 (1927) (price-fixing agreement
where defendants control 82% of market is illegal per se). Even if price-fixing is not part of a cartel
arrangement and the market share of the price-fixers is minimal, price-fixing agreements are still
illegal per se. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225 n.59 (market power
not necessary element in finding price-fixing to be illegal per se), reh. denied, 310 U.S. 658 (1940).
Maximum price-fixing is also illegal per se. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (agreement among liquor distillers to fix maximum prices above which whole-
salers could not resell is illegal per se), reh. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951).
34. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (per se rule applies to
market division arrangements regardless of whether linked to price-fixing or other restraints).
35. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (per curiam) (agree-
ment to eliminate free short-term credit sales to retailers is illegal per se); National Macaroni Mfrs.
Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421, 426 (7th Cir. 1965) (agreement among competitors to reduce durum
wheat content of macaroni is illegal per se); United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, 285 F.2d 688,
691 (7th Cir. 1961) (agreement not to advertise price except by sign on pump held illegal); Plymouth
Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 279 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir. 1960) (agreement between competing car
dealers on "list price" is illegal per se, even though cars almost never sold at that price).
36. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 210 (1959) (conspiracy
between retailer and manufacturers not to sell to rival retailer illegal); Fashion Originators' Guild of
America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941) (agreement among guild members not to sell to
retailers who stocked garments copied by other manufacturers from designs of guild members illegal).
37. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 458-59 (1978) (compari-
son of competitor prices before making price concessions to buyers illegal); United States v. Container
Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 335 (1969) (informal exchange among suppliers of price information
about most recent sales illegal). But see Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563,
582 (1925) (mere exchange of information is not "an unreasonable restraint, or in any respect
unlawful").
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upon some form of direct or indirect communication among competitors.
Therefore, the antitrust laws proscribe certain business relationships, even
in the absence of an actual showing of anticompetitive behavior, if those
relationships are presumed to facilitate such behavior. The section 8 ban
against interlocking directorates between competing corporations is an ex-
ample of this latter type of prohibition.3 Congress perceived the interlock-
ing directorate to be an important means by which competitors consum-
mate horizontal agreements-both formal cartel agreements and informal
sharings of commercial information-that facilitate anticompetitive deci-
sions on pricing and output."9
38. Although § 8 is the primary statute prohibiting interlocking directorates, other statutes have
been used to the same end. For example, in recent years, the FTC has used § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976), to challenge interlocking directorates as an unfair
method of competition. See, e.g., Perpetual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 90 F.T.C. 608, 648 (1977) (using
§ 5 of FTC Act against savings and loan institution interlocks not covered by § 8 of Clayton Act),
order withdrawn and complaint dismissed, 94 F.T.C. 401 (1979) (§ 5 amended to exempt interlock in
question); Kraftco Corp., 89 F.T.C. 46, 60 (1977) (interlocking directorate violates § 5 in addition to
§ 8), remanded on other grounds sub nom. SCM Corp. v. FTC, 565 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1977), petition
for review denied, 612 F.2d 707 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 821 (1980). One commentator has
argued that § 8 was not worded more broadly because Congress believed that other interlocks would
be covered by § 5. Note, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks: Dealing with Interlocking Directorates, 11
J.L. REFORM 361, 379 (1978).
Furthermore, interlocking directorates in conjunction with conspiracies or combinations in restraint
of trade have been prohibited in consent decrees terminating government antitrust actions under §§ 1
and 3 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1976). These decrees prohibit interlocking directorates
and, unlike § 8 of the Clayton Act, prohibit interlocking officers and employees. See, e.g., United
States v. True Temper Corp., 1959 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,441, at 75,664 (N.D. Ill. 1959) (manu-
facturer prohibited from permitting officers, directors, or employees to serve as officer, director, or
employee of competitor); United States v. Pittsburgh Crushed Steel Co., 1954 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
67,892, at 69,884 (N.D. Ohio 1954) (same). Other statutes regulate interlocks in particular industries.
See, e.g., Federal Alcohol Administration Act § 8, 27 U.S.C. § 208 (1976) (regulating interlocks
between companies in liquor industry); Communications Act of 1934 § 212, 47 U.S.C. § 212 (1976)
(regulating interlocks between communications carriers).
39. The central purpose of the Sherman Act was to preserve "free and unfettered competition as
the rule of trade," Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); the central purpose
of the Clayton Act was to supplement the Sherman Act, United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 355
(1922). The Congressional committees that studied the effects of interlocking directorates before the
passage of the Clayton Act concluded that common directors perform the function of maintaining
uniform policies with regard to pricing and output among competitors, thereby hampering free com-
petition. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. NO. 678, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.
47-48 (1914); REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. NO. 627, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 17-21 (1914); HOUSE BANKING & CURRENCY COMM., INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF
CONTROL OF MONEY AND CREDIT, H.R. REP. NO. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913) (Pujo Commit-
tee Report); HOUSING BANKING AND CURRENCY COMM., INVESTIGATION OF UNITED STATES STEEL
CORPORATION, H.R. REP. NO. 1127, Part 1, 62d Cong., 1st Sess. (1912) (Stanley Committee Report).
The House Judiciary Committee Report on the Clayton bill spelled out the purpose behind the ban
on interlocking directorates: "The truth is that the only real service the same director in a great
number of corporations renders is in maintaining uniform policies throughout the entire system...
to the detriment of the public generally." H.R. REP. NO. 627, supra, 19-20 (1914). The Senate
Committee Report adopted this analysis in recommending passage of the bill. S. REP. NO. 698, supra,
48 (1914).
Section 8 of the Clayton Act was therefore premised on the notion that "elimination of the competi-
tion between the corporations was to be presumed from the very existence of common directors."
United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 656 F.2d 428, 438 (9th Cir. 1981). Through § 8, Congress
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Every participant in a formal cartel agreement to restrict pricing or
output is under great pressure to cheat on the agreement: to lower its
prices and receive greater revenues through increased sales. Such agree-
ments thus will break down unless each member knows that any cheating
will be detected immediately. Although there are other methods of moni-
toring anticompetitive agreements-telephone calls, trade association
meetings, and business lunches-none of these is as effective as an inter-
locking directorate. If members of the interlocked firms' boards of direc-
tors can trust each other to broadcast each firm's operations to other mem-
bers of the cartel, then the incentive to cheat is eliminated and the cartel is
preserved." °
Of greater significance is the role of interlocking directorates in facili-
tating informal sharings of commercial information. For example, a firm
could use an interlock to inform other firms of its pricing schedules, pro-
duction plans, and marketing strategies, all of which might promote the
coordination of pricing and output decisions. In each of these cases, anti-
trust enforcement officials face the problem of detecting an agreement. An
interlock, by eliminating the need for telephone calls or other forms of
communication, makes such detection extremely difficult. Although an in-
terlock is merely an enforcement mechanism and not itself anticompetitive,
Congress decided to make both the interlock and the agreement it facili-
tates illegal per se."1
hoped "to nip in the bud incipient violations of the antitrust laws by removing the opportunity or
temptation to such violations through interlocking directorates. The legislation was essentially pre-
ventative." United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
40. See J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 358 (2d ed. 1980) (stressing impor-
tance of effective and secret enforcement of cartel agreements).
41. See, e.g., Perpetual Say. & Loan Ass'n, 90 F.T.C. 608, 619 (1977) ("[There is no need to
assess the nature of the industry or to look at mitigating circumstances. [Section 8] is a per se stat-
ute."), order withdrawn and complaint dismissed on other grounds, 94 F.T.C. 401 (1979); REPORT OF
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N ON INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES 10 (1951) ("[Blased on the practi-
cal certainty that an interlocking directorate between competitors ha[s] an adverse effect upon compe-
tition, [section 8] does not require for its enforcement any proof that in the particular instance the
expected effect actually exists."). In fact, no study has ever produced concrete evidence that an inter-
lock facilitates anticompetitive behavior. A 1965 congressional report on interlocks noted:
Since the turn of the century there have been a number of congressional and private studies
into the frequency and extent in the corporate structure of interconnected managements. At the
present time, however, there is a scarcity of information relative to the social and economic
effects, as embodied in actual business transactions, of decisions made by linked corporate
managements. There is virtually no reliable current information that will demonstrate either
acceptable or undesirable effects that have resulted from the circumstances that common man-
agement personnel participated in, or influenced, particular business transactions.
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965). The committee report concluded, however, that "it would be naive to
think that the ability of two corporations to compete is not impaired by common management mem-
bers. . . . Conclusions supported by common sense and abstract reasoning should not lightly be disre-
garded in the absence of convincing evidence that there is error." Id. at 230.
There is arguably a competitive benefit from interlocking directorates in that such directorates al-
low firms to choose the most productive individuals to serve on their corporate boards, despite those
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2. Application of Section 8 to Labor-Union Board Representation
The application of section 8 to labor-union board representation has
not yet been considered by any court.42 Both the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) and the Department of Justice, however, have issued advisory
opinions on the subject. The Department of Justice concluded that section
8 should apply to labor unions because unions have "an incentive to be-
come aware of and influence. . . the commercial and financial affairs" of
their employers.4 Because of this incentive, the Justice Department con-
cluded that employee representation in unionized industries should be
prohibited when the union members sit "as representatives of the
union.""" The Justice Department did not specify the criteria for deter-
mining when a union member sits as a union representative.
The FTC reached the opposite conclusion.45 It reasoned that Congress
did not intend section 8 to "reach interlocking directorates formed through
'representatives' of a common labor union" and that thus this form of
interlock should be exempt from section 8 coverage.46 The FTC's analysis
was twofold: first, such an application of section 8 "would extend its reach
beyond the situations which Congress intended to be per se unlawful,"
and second, labor-union director interlocks do "not present the risk of
individuals' service on other boards in the same industry. Congress determined, however, that the
anticompetitive dangers of the interlock far outweighed that possible benefit. H.R. REP. No. 627,
supra note 39, at 19-20 (1914).
Other reasons for prohibiting interlocking directorates are unrelated to the anticompetitive dangers
of interlocks and, hence, are not considered in this Note. These reasons include the diminished oppor-
tunity for advancement by young corporate managers, the fear of consolidation of corporate power
into a few hands, and the adverse effect on the quality of management of multiple commitments. See
Travers, Interlocks in Corporate Mianagement and the Antitrust Laws, 46 TEX. L. REV. 819, 833-38
(1968).
42. There is at least one case involving a union member on a board of directors. United Mine
Workers President W.A. Boyle served on the board of directors of a bank whose stock was owned
primarily by the union. The court held that Boyle had violated § 501(a) of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, see supra note 24, because he was compensated for his service. United
Mine Workers v. Boyle, 78 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11,183, at 20,051 (D.D.C. 1975). Because the case
did not involve union membership on boards of competing firms, the § 8 issue did not arise.
43. Interlocking Directorates-Union Representation, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,425, at
55,967 (Feb. 26, 1981). The justice Department, in its advisory opinion to the UAW, noted that in
United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ohio 1974), afid mem., 513 F.2d 633
(6th Cir. 1975), the government had argued that "a corporation sat on the boards of competing corpo-
rations through representatives" and therefore concluded that "there is no reason why the UAW,
under the proper circumstances, could not also violate Section 8 under this theory." The Justice De-
partment concluded that "if 'the union' should sit on the boards of both Chrysler and AMC through
representatives, Section 8 would be violated." Interlocking Directorates-Union Representation, 5
TRADE REG. REP. 1 50,425, at 55,967 (Feb. 26, 1981).
44. Interlocking Directorates-Union Representation, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 50,425, at 55,967
(Feb. 26, 1981).
45. See International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 21,822, at 22,055 (May 8, 1981).
46. Id.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 92: 106, 1982
competitive harm at which Section 8 was aimed."'
An analysis of the text and purpose of section 8 suggests that the Jus-
tice Department's interpretation is correct. First, the text of section 8 does
not foreclose application to labor-union director interlocks. Section 8 states
that no "person" shall sit on the boards of directors of competing corpora-
tions. 48 Because section 1 of the Act defines "persons" to include associa-
tions, 9 and the Supreme Court has held that labor unions are associations
for the purposes of the antitrust laws,5" unions fall within the literal pur-
view of section 8. In addition, there is no indication in the legislative his-
tory that Congress intended such interlocks to be excluded from the cover-
age of section 8.
Unions have the same economic incentives to restrict product-market
competition as does management and thus fall within the prophylactic
purpose of section 8. A union is chiefly concerned with maximizing the
wages and benefits of its members.51 The revenues that a firm receives
necessarily set a ceiling on the wages payable to employees; if total reve-
nues are increased, then wages and benefits can be increased. Because a
firm's revenue generally can be increased through a restraint on product-
market competition, a union has a strong incentive to help an employer
maximize revenues by restricting competition.52 A reduction in product-
market competition would also protect the jobs of fellow union members
employed by less efficient competitors."3 Finally, severe product-market
competition, particularly with nonunion firms, can increase employer re-
47. Id.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976); see supra note 2 (quoting § 19).
49. Section 1 of the Clayton Act provides: "The word 'person' or 'persons' wherever used in this
Act shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws
of . . . the United States .. " 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1976).
50. See United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 392 (1922). The Court's
inclusion of unions as associations and hence as "persons" is based on the language of the Sherman
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976). Because the language defining "persons" in the Sherman Act is identical to
the language in the Clayton Act, the same construction should apply to the Clayton Act.
51. A secondary purpose of the union is to "enable workers to participate jointly with manage-
ment in the government of their industrial lives through chosen representatives even as all of us may
participate, through elected representatives, in political government." Cox, The Role of Law in Pre-
serving Union Democracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 609, 610 (1959).
52. See Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards
to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 17, 22 (1963) ("[Llabor and management are unified by their
mutual interest in seeing [product market] competition limited. . . . Empirical evidence bears out
these conclusions. There have been many instances of direct or indirect price-fixing by unions."). The
UAW, for example, has actively sought the imposition of import quotas and other barriers to foreign
competition in order to protect union interests. See, e.g., Testimony of UAW President Douglas A.
Fraser Before the International Trade Commission (Oct. 8, 1980), quoted in Memorandum of Ameri-
can Motors Corporation, Interlocking Directorates-Union Representation, 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 1 50,425, at 55,967 (Feb. 26, 1981).
53. See Summers, supra note 27, at 178. A reduction in product-market competition is designed to
reduce the available supply of a product in order to raise its price. The effect of such a reduction
would be to reduce the likelihood of further employment, but the union is arguably more concerned
with its present members than with the possibility of future members.
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sistance to collective bargaining demands, creating further incentives for
the union to restrict competition in the product market.54
Unions representing the employees of several competitors within an in-
dustry are particularly well situated to facilitate product-market re-
straints, whether through formal agreements with employers or through
less visible and more informal agreements consummated in directors'
meetings.55 The courts have found many examples of agreements between
unions and employers.56 Application of section 8 to labor-union board
representation is consequently consistent with the statute's purpose of for-
bidding practices that facilitate agreements to restrain competition.
The mere fact that the same union member or officer would not sit on
more than one board within an industry should not insulate the union
from section 8 coverage. Courts have held in other areas of the law that
an entity, such as a corporation, a partnership, or a union, can incur lia-
bility through the actions of a "deputy" or "representative" of that en-
tity.57 According to this deputization theory, a person is a "deputy" of an
54. Winter, supra note 52, at 18. See generally M. BARATZ, THE UNION AND THE COAL INDUS-
TRY 39-74 (1955) (describing connection between increased product-market competition in coal indus-
try and employer resistance to union demands); Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REV.
1183, 1190 (1980) (nonunion firm can price its product below that of unionized competitors, forcing
those competitors to reduce costs, including labor costs).
Furthermore, profit-sharing compensation plans and union pension funds with significant invest-
ments in the employer-corporation create additional union incentives to foster employer profitability.
Steuer, supra note 4, at 272.
55. This analysis assumes that the product market is competitive. If the product-market price is
already a monopoly price, then the union would be unable to increase its own wage share by re-
straining product-market competition. In this type of industry, therefore, a labor-union interlock
would not pose anticompetitive dangers. Likewise, this analysis assumes that the labor market is
competitive. If the union were powerful enough to control the labor supply perfectly, then it could
regulate entry into the industry and determine the market price through its control of labor costs.
Union conspiracy with employers to control product-market competition are symptoms of imperfect
employer monopoly and imperfect union monopoly. See McKie, Collective Bargaining and the Main-
tenance of Market Competition, in THE PUBLIC STAKE IN UNION POWER 92-93 (P. Bradley ed.
1959).
Furthermore, the greater the elasticity of demand for labor in a particular industry, the less the
union would benefit from restraints in product-market competition. In the case of high elasticity of
demand for labor, capital could be substituted easily for labor, putting the union in a weaker bargain-
ing position when seeking higher wages. As the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department noted:
"[t]he higher the labor costs as a component of the final product, . . the more likely that labor
unions will become involved in trying to control secondary market competition." REPORT OF THE
TASK GROUP ON ANTITRUST IMMUNITIES 34 (1977).
56. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 659-61 (1965) (union conspired
with large coal operators to impose agreed-upon wage and royalty scales upon smaller operators to
drive latter from market); United States v. Employing Lathers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 198, 199-200 (1954)
(union combined with trade association to exclude out-of-state contractors from local market); United
Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 398-99 (unions and millwork manufacturers con-
spire to prevent out-of-state manufacturers from selling in local market and to prevent area dealers
from handling out-of-state goods); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797,
799-800 (1945) (union combined with local electrical equipment manufacturers to exclude out-of-state
manufacturers, thereby allowing local manufacturers to engage in price-fixing).
57. This "deputization theory" has been adopted by the courts in enforcing § 16(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). See, e.g., Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 409
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entity if that person has a fiduciary relationship to the entity and a con-
comitant obligation to represent its interests.58 Thus, if a board member
has a fiduciary duty to the union to represent its interests, then, for the
purposes of section 8, the "union" is sitting on the board of directors.
Although no court has applied the deputization theory to section 8, the
theory's recent acceptance by the FTC59 and the Department of Justice 0
may be tantamount to judicial approval because section 8 cases are rarely
litigated. 1
B. Labor Exemption from Antitrust Prosecution
Both a statutory and a nonstatutory exemption protect labor unions
from antitrust prosecution. Neither of these exemptions, however, should
protect labor-union board representation from section 8 enforcement.
1. Statutory Exemption
Congress has passed two statutes-the Clayton Act62 and the Norris-
(1962) (noting in dictum that partnership could be "director" of company under deputization theory
in action based on § 16(b) of 1934 Act); Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d. 260, 263-66 (2d
Cir. 1969) (corporation held director of another corporation under deputization theory because officer
of first corporation served as director of second corporation), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970). But
see Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (stockholder in
family corporation held not to be deputy of corporation while sitting on board of another corporation).
The government argued that the deputization theory should be applied to § 8 in United States v.
Cleveland Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ohio 1974), afl'd mem., 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975).
The case was subsequently settled pursuant to a consent decree that endorsed the government's theory.
United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,611 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
58. Interlocking Directorates-Union Representation, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,425, at
55,967 (Feb. 26, 1981).
59. In its advisory opinion to the UAW, the FTC concluded that the deputization theory applied
to § 8 but concluded that § 8 did not cover labor-union interlocks. International Union, United Auto-
mobile Workers, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,822, at 22,055 (May 8, 1981).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 699, 711 (N.D. Ohio 1974)
(Justice Department arguing deputization theory applies to § 8 cases), atfd mem., 513 F.2d 633 (6th
Cir. 1975); Interlocking Directorates-Union Representation, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,425, at
55,967 (Feb. 26, 1981) (Justice Department advisory opinion concluding that UAW representation
violates § 8 under deputization theory).
61. Generally, either the FTC or the Department of Justice will file a complaint and convince the
defendant to resign one of the directorates to avoid litigation. Thus, the antitrust enforcement agencies'
view of the law is extremely important in the absence of a definitive judicial decision on the subject.
From 1914 until 1965, the Department of Justice instituted only 10 § 8 suits. During the same
period, the FTC filed 13 complaints, 12 of which were dismissed after the directors involved voluntar-
ily resigned from all but one of the directorships in question. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, REPORT ON INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 227 (1965).
Until 1974, only nine § 8 suits had been brought by private parties. See Note, Private Enforcement of
Section 8"s Prohibition of Interlocking Directorates, 54 B.U.L. REV. 659, 660 n.1 1 (1974). During the
1970's, however, both the FTC and the Justice Department stepped up their.enforcement of § 8. See
Wilson, Unlocking Interlocks: The On-Again Off-Again Saga of Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 45
ANTITRUST L.J. 317, 318 (1976) (citing "unprecedented number of recent cases challenging corporate
interlocks").
62. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976).
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LaGuardia Act 6 -that declare that labor unions are not combinations in
restraint of trade.64 The courts have consistently held that these statutes
exempt certain union activities from the operation of the antitrust laws."6
These exempted activities include those unilaterally undertaken by a
union in the furtherance of its own interests.6" This statutory exemption,
however, does not protect agreements between unions and nonlabor
groups, such as employers."7 Because board representation arises out of a
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 104-105 (1976).
64. Although Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890 to eliminate agreements in restraint of
trade among business corporations, the Act initially was applied more frequently to labor unions than
businesses. A. COX, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 33 (9th ed.
1981).
Believing that employee collective action served a valuable function in equalizing bargaining power
between labor and management, Congress explicitly exempted labor unions from antitrust prosecution
under the Clayton Act in 1914. Section 6 of the Act states that "[n]othing contained in the antitrust
laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . organizations, . . . nor
shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws." 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976). Section 20 of the
Act limits the power of the federal courts to grant injunctions in labor disputes and specifically ex-
empts certain labor union activities from the antitrust laws:
No restraining order or injunction. . . shall prohibit any person or persons. . . from ceasing
to perform any work . . . ; or from peacefully persuading any person . . . to abstain from
working; or from ceasing to patronize . . . any party to such dispute . . . ; or from paying
• * * any strike benefits . . . ; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner..
29 U.S.C. §52 (1976).
The Supreme Court severely limited the scope of § 20 in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U.S. 443, 469 (1921) (Clayton Act confers no antitrust immunity when union departs from "nor-
mal and legitimate" behavior). Thus, Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 104-105 (1976), containing a declaration of policy favoring the freedom of employees to organize
collectively and forbidding the issuance of injunctions by federal courts against employees engaged in
certain specified activities in the context of a labor dispute, closely resembling those activities protected
by § 20 of the Clayton Act. In particular, § 5 of the Act prohibited the issuance of an injunction on
the ground that the union is "engaged in an unlawful combination or conspiracy because of the doing
in concert" of various acts enumerated in § 4 of the Act and § 20 of the Clayton Act. 29 U.S.C. § 105
(1976).
65. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1975). This
"statutory" exemption was first articulated by the Court in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219
(1941). In that case, the Court held that those union actions that are immune from injunction by
virtue of the Clayton or Norris-LaGuardia Acts are also immune from antitrust enforcement. Id. at
236; see, e.g., United States v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 47 F. Supp. 304, 308-09 (N.D. Ill.
1942) (union efforts to secure agreements from employers not to employ nonunion musicians consti-
tute "labor dispute" within meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and are exempt from Sherman
Act), aff'd per curiam, 318 U.S. 741 (1943); United States v. Carrozzo, 37 F. Supp. 191, 195-97
(N.D. Ill. 1941) (strikes and threats of strikes to save jobs of union members are legitimate under
Norris-LaGuardia Act and exempt from Sherman Act), af'd per curiam sub nom. United States v.
International Hod Carriers District Council, 313 U.S. 539 (1941); Handler & Zifchak, Collective
Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws: The Emasculation of the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
459, 475-79 (1981) (discussing labor's statutory exemption from antitrust prosecution).
66. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1975).
67. The Supreme Court noted in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), that "[slo
long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups," the union is
exempt from antitrust enforcement. Id. at 232. The Supreme Court has consistently held, however,
that if a union combines with a non-labor group, it loses its statutory exemption. See, e.g., United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662-63 (1965) (statutory immunity lost when union
agrees with one employer about wages it will exact from another employer not involved in same
negotiations); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 808-10 (1945) (statu-
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union-management agreement, it is not protected by the statutory
exemption.
2. Nonstatutory Exemption
If a union combines with a nonlabor group, thereby precluding applica-
tion of the statutory exemption, the union's activities may still be exempt
under a judicially created "nonstatutory exemption." The Supreme Court
held in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local Union No. 100 that
"a proper accommodation between the congressional policy favoring col-
lective bargaining. . . and the congressional policy favoring free competi-
tion in business markets requires that some union-employer agreements
be accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions." 69
The source of this nonstatutory exemption is the national labor policy
articulated in the National Labor Relations Act 70 favoring the association
of employees to eliminate competition over wages and working condi-
tions."1 Although union organization of employees and standardization of
wages ultimately decrease price competition among employers in product
markets, the Supreme Court has recognized that the "goals of federal la-
bor law never could be achieved if this effect on business competition were
held a violation of the antitrust laws."'7 2 In light of the competing goals of
increased product-market competition and promotion of worker organiza-
tion, courts have been forced to distinguish those union-employer agree-
ments that are legitimate from those that are not.
To draw this distinction, courts have examined whether the union-em-
ployer agreement in question restrains competition only in the labor mar-
ket, in which case the agreement is legitimate, or whether the agreement
tory immunity lost when union conspires with employer to close competition to out-of-state manufac-
turers); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 611-12 (8th Cir. 1976) (statutory immu-
nity lost when union and employer agree to restrict product-market competition), cert. dismissed, 434
U.S. 801 (1977).
68. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
69. 421 U.S. at 616, 622 (1975) (emphasis added); see Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965) (exemption for union-employer agreements de-
pends on accomodation of Sherman Act and national labor policy). This nonstatutory exemption
arises out of the policy of the federal labor laws and hence is not nonstatutory in a strict sense. The
labor laws do not explicitly grant this exemption, however, and hence the exemption is, for conve-
nience, considered nonstatutory.
70. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
71. The Act provides a legal basis for the right of employees to "self-organiz[e], . to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1976).
72. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975). The Court
had previously noted that "an elimination of price competition based on differences in labor standards
is the objective of any national labor organization. But this effect on competition has not been consid-
ered to be the kind of curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act." Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503-04 (1940).
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restrains competition in the product market, in which case a more careful
analysis is required. The Supreme Court first considered the issue of
union-employer agreements restraining product-market competition in Al-
len Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW. 3 The Court held that a
union-employer agreement excluding out-of-state manufacturers from the
local market was not exempt from Sherman Act enforcement despite its
furtherance of union interests because it directly restrained product-mar-
ket competition."4
Twenty years later, the Court modified its blanket rule against union-
employer agreements that restrain product-market competition. In Local
Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,7 5 the
Court allowed a union-employer agreement restricting retail marketing
hours because of the importance of the union interest at stake. Justice
White7 6 wrote that agreements restraining product-market competition
should be exempt from antitrust sanctions if they are "intimately related
to wages, hours and working conditions. . . .7 By weighing the severity
of the restraint on competition against the labor interest protected by that
restraint, Justice White introduced a balancing test into the process of
determining the legitimacy of union-employer agreements.7 8 In Connell
73. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
74. The Court held:
[W]e think Congress never intended that unions could, consistently with the Sherman Act, aid
non-labor groups to create business monopolies and to control the marketing of goods and
services. . . . [Wihen the union participated with a combination of business men who had
complete power to eliminate all competition among themselves and to prevent all competition
from others, a situation was created not included within the exemptions of the Clayton and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts.
Id. at 808-09.
75. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
76. The Court split into three opinions, each signed by three Justices. Justice White's opinion is
the Opinion of the Court.
77. 381 U.S. at 689. The district court had found as an issue of fact that a limitation on market-
ing hours was necessary to protect union member's jobs and working hours, which, for Justice White,
satisfied the "intimately related" test. Id. at 694-96.
78. Justice White stressed in a footnote that the "crucial determinant is not the form of the agree-
ment" but rather "its relative impact on the product market and the interests of the union members"
which the restraint protects. Id. at 690 n.5. White noted: "Employers and unions are required to
bargain about wages, hours and working conditions, and this fact weighs heavily in favor of antitrust
exemption for agreements on these subjects." Id. at 689. Other Justices sharply criticized this balanc-
ing test. Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, character-
ized the test as "a throwback to past days when courts allowed antitrust actions against unions and
employers engaged in conventional collective bargaining, because 'a judge considered' the union or
employer conduct in question to be 'socially or economically' objectionable." Id. at 700 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (citing Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 485 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing)). Commentators also have criticized the test. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 54, at 1217 (Jewel Tea
test leads to "unprincipled and inconsistent decisionmaking"); St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at
the Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REV. 603, 616 (1976) ("Any reintroduction of the pre-Norris-
La Guardia judicial technique of balancing the social plusses and minuses of union objectives must be
viewed with some apprehension.").
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Construction,9 the Court affirmed this balancing test, noting that re-
straints on product-market competition would not be covered by the non-
statutory exemption if they did not "follow naturally from the elimination
of competition over wages and working conditions." 80
No court has ever considered the applicability of the nonstatutory ex-
emption to labor-union director interlocks. Union board representation,
however, is not "intimately related" to protected labor-union interests and
hence should not be exempt from antitrust prosecution. Although im-
provement of wages, hours, and working conditions is one of the indirect
goals of union board representation, there is no intimate relationship be-
tween the two. Furthermore, board representation is not a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining."" In Jewel Tea, the Court indicated that
product-market restraints arising out of agreements on nonmandatory
bargaining subjects do not meet the "intimately related" test. 2 Hence
board representation should not be accorded a nonstatutory exemption.
III. Distinguishing Permissible from Impermissible Labor-Union Board
Representation
Section 8 does not ban all employee representation in unionized indus-
tries. For example, an employee representative who is neither a member
nor an agent of a union would not raise section 8 problems.8 3 Similarly, a
representative who belongs to a union with membership limited to one
firm would avoid section 8 strictures. The problem case occurs when the
employee representative is a member of a union representing more than
one firm and when that representative is found to be an agent of the na-
tional union under current deputization theory.84 This Note proposes a
79. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975). The Court
stated:
This kind of direct restraint on the business market has substantial anticompetitive effects,
both actual and potential, that would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition
over wages and working conditions. It contravenes antitrust policies to a degree not justified by
congressional labor policy, and therefore cannot claim a nonstatutory exemption from the anti-
trust laws.
Id. at 625. Some commentators have characterized the Court in Connell as introducing a "least re-
strictive alternative" analysis. See D. LESLIE, LABOR LAW IN A NUTSHELL 270 (1979). Under this
analysis, those union restraints that impair product-market competition "more than necessary for the
elimination of competition over wages and working conditions" are not exempt from antitrust enforce-
ment. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 31, 71 229f, at 220; see also St. Antoine, supra note 78,
at 622 n.90 (product market restraints allowed under Connell "only to the extent . . . necessary to
further a union's lawful objectives").
80. 421 U.S. at 623.
81. See supra note 12.
82. Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 679
(1965).
83. An example of such an employee representative would be someone sympathetic to the union's
interest but who has no fiduciary responsibility to the union, such as a labor lawyer.
84. Indeed, the Justice Department, which stated in its advisory opinion that labor unions should
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twofold test whereby an antitrust enforcement agency can determine
whether an employee representative who is a union member represents
only the employees in his own firm, or whether he represents the national
union.
A. Identifying Labor-Union Representatives that Violate Section 8
Labor unions in the United States are far less oligarchic than their Eu-
ropean counterparts.8 5 Although the local is subject to the national consti-
tution, it functions within the national union as a separate political unit
with significant local autonomy. It elects its own officers by a direct vote
of the members and makes its own policies.8 6 Furthermore, many locals
negotiate their own employment contracts without the direction of the na-
tional union.8 7 Product-market competition reinforces this weaker loyalty
to the national union. In many instances, the interests of one firm's em-
ployees conflict with the interests of the employees of other firms in the
same industry, even though both groups of employees are represented by
the same union. For example, one firm may become more profitable at the
expense of another firm through a shift in market share; in such a case,
the employees of the successful firm stand to benefit indirectly at the ex-
pense of the employees of the less successful firm. Thus the interests of the
local may at times actually conflict with the interests of the national.8
In light of the realities of union structure, courts should consider two
factors in distinguishing board members who should be considered repre-
sentatives of the national union from those who are deputies of the local
union. First, the representative should be neither a national union official
nor chosen by the national union. Second, if the collective bargaining
agreement is not negotiated by the local union, then the representative
should not be a full-time union official. If the union representative meets
these requirements, courts should find that he represents only the union
members in his particular company and therefore his service as a board
member does not violate section 8.
The proposed standard is premised on a recognition of the frequent
independence of local unions from the national organization, and of rank-
not be excluded from § 8 coverage, argued that employee representation in unionized industries would
be legitimate if the representative did not represent the union. See Interlocking Directorates-Union
Representation, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 150,425 (Feb. 26, 1981).
85. See Summers, supra note 8, at 384.
86. Id. at 385.
87. Id.
88. In a less successful industry with failing companies, there is a greater likelihood that one
firm's employees will prefer that firm's interests over the interests of a rival company, thus indirectly
pitting one local union against another. In a more successful industry, cooperation among locals at
competing firms is more likely. Employee board representation has usually been proposed in the
United States in less successful industries.
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and-file members from the local union. The standard identifies collective
bargaining as a proxy for independence of the local from the national. If
the local union does its own bargaining, it is sufficiently independent of
the national to avoid characterizing the local official as a deputy of the
national union."' Furthermore, even if the national union bargains on be-
half of the local, union board representation would be illegal under the
standard only when the representative was a full-time official of the local.
Rank-and-file union members who serve on the boards of their employers
have no agency relationship to the union. Their only real connection to
the union is their obligation as employees to pay union dues. Without
more, they are not deputies of the union any more than dues-paying
members of a political party are deputies of their party.
B. Preserving the Benefits of Labor-Union Board Representation
Under the proposed standard, the advantages of union board represen-
tation are retained while avoiding the anticompetitive dangers of inter-
locking directorates. First, the benefit of union board representation as a
supplement to collective bargaining is preserved by allowing full-time
union officials chosen by the local to serve as board representatives. These
officials would serve the legitimating function needed to persuade the
membership to accept wage and benefit concessions or other less attractive
contract offers. Even though a national union official such as UAW Presi-
dent Douglas Fraser would probably have the greatest legitimacy with the
membership, such a high official is not necessary to achieve the desired
result.90
Second, the proposed standard would preserve the benefit of employee
control of the work environment. Particularly in the case of a local union
with significant autonomy from the national union, board representation
by one of the local's full-time officials would be an effective supplement to
other forms of worker participation needed to permit employees to develop
a sense of constituent control over the enterprise. With respect to this ben-
efit of board representation, a local union official or member would be
equally if not more effective than a national union official, because of that
89. This distinction between mere members and full-time officials is consistent with distinctions
drawn in other areas of the law with respect to when a person is properly considered a deputy of an
organization. For example, directors and officers of corporations are generally considered to be agents
of the corporation, whereas mere employees are not so regarded. See H. HENN, supra note 28, § 235,
at 457.
90. Arguably, a union official would not wish to serve as a board director as part of a wage and
benefit concession package because of potential charges of co-optation from the rank-and-file. There-
fore, a board representative who is not a union official may be the most satisfactory representative to
all parties concerned in terms of legitimating the employer's request for wage and benefit concessions.
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representative's close contact with the rank-and-file.91
Conclusion
This Note argues that the Clayton Act's ban on interlocking director-
ates should apply to labor-union director interlocks because union repre-
sentatives have the same economic incentive as do other directors to violate
the antitrust laws by restricting product-market competition. Moreover,
the nonstatutory exemption for labor unions from antitrust sanctions
should not apply in this context because of the interlock's significant effect
on price competition. The Note proposes a test for determining when an
employee representative in a unionized industry does in fact "represent"
the union. The test preserves the advantages of employee board represen-
tation while proscribing employee representation that poses too great a
danger of anticompetitive behavior.
91. The most important aspect of employee board representation in terms of providing employee
control over decisionmaking within the enterprise is the ability of employees to choose the representa-
tives who will articulate their views in board meetings. See P. BLUMBERG, supra note 21, at 126-39.
The proposed standard preserves this right of election and thereby reinforces this sense of employee
control.
